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Abstract
This chapter aims at presenting and scrutinizing a contractarian approach to lib-
ertarianism,	which	 has	 been	 proposed	 by	 a	Canadian	 philosopher,	 Jan	Narveson,	
known	as	the	main	proponent	of	so-called	contractarian	libertarianism.	The	chapter	
begins	with	 the	short	 introduction	followed	by	“Assumptions,”	discussing	Narve-
son’s	understanding	of	morality,	his	critique	of	Rawlsian	methodology	and	his	view	
on	natural	law	and	natural	rights.	Afterwards,	“Social	contract:	justification,	proce-
dure, motives” presents such elements in the philosophy of Narveson as advantages 
of	contractarianism,	levels	of	the	social	contract	and	its	status,	as	well	as	motives	
of parties being subject to the social contract. The third part, entitled “Critics vs. 
Narveson” touches on a critical discussion of the subject by other theorists (Tibor R. 
Machan, John T. Sanders, Leo Groarke). The last section, “Is the Contractarianism 
of Narveson Libertarianism?” presents the thesis that Narveson’s contractarianism 
is	not	a	justified	basis	of	libertarianism.	Albeit	he	comes	to	conclusions	agreeable	to	
libertarianism, his philosophy is better labeled as laissez-faire.
Keywords: Ian Narveson, contractarianism, social contract, foundations of liber-
tarianism.
Resumen
Este artículo se propone presentar y explorar la aproximación contractualista al 
libertarismo	planteada	por	el	filósofo	canadiense	Jan	Narveson,	conocido	como	el	
principal representante del llamado libertarismo contractualista. El trabajo empieza 
con una breve introducción seguida de un apartado que, bajo el rótulo de “Supues-
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tos”, discute la comprensión de Narveson de la moralidad, su crítica a la metodología 
de	Rawls	y	su	visión	de	la	ley	natural	y	los	derechos	naturales.	Posteriormente,	en	el	
apartado	“Contrato	social:	justificación,	procedimiento,	motivos”	se	presentan	estos	
elementos	de	la	filosofía	de	Narveson	como	ventajas	del	contractualismo,	niveles	del	
contrato social y de su estatus, y también como motivaciones de las partes sometidas 
al contrato social. En la tercera sección, titulada “Críticas contra Narveson”, se abor-
da la discusión crítica sobre el tema planteada por otros teóricos (Tibor R. Machan, 
John T. Sanders, Leo Groarke). La última sección, “¿Es libertario el contractualismo 
de Narveson?” propone la tesis de que el contractualismo de Narveson no puede ser 
contemplado como una forma legítima de libertarismo. Pues por más que Narveson 
llegue	a	conclusiones	compatibles	con	el	libertarismo,	su	filosofía	encajaría	más	bien	
en la categoría del laissez-faire. 
Palabras clave: Ian Narveson, contractualismo, contrato social, fundamentos del 
libertarismo.
Ethical foundations are one of the most important problems in libertarian political 
philosophy.1 It may be the case because of a—not very popular among contempo-
rary	political	philosophers—specific	relationship	between	ethics	and	politics	within	
libertarianism. The relationship is based on the assumption that political philosophy 
is	a	subdiscipline	of	ethical	theory	and	it	requires	that	in	order	to	answer	a	political	
question	one	needs	to	have	a	clear	and	sound	view	of	ethics.	On	the	basis	of	which	
one evaluates not only interpersonal relations but also a public sphere in general. 
The	only	permissible	political	actions	are	those	which	meet	ethical	rules.	Combined	
with	a	methodological	and	ontological	individualism	the	libertarian	approach	makes	
politics	a	standard	field	of	action	which	is	subject	to	the	same	rules	as	any	relation	
between	every	two	(or	more)	human	beings	in	a	society.2
A	standard	 libertarian	view	 is	based	on	natural	 law	and	natural	 rights	 theory.3 
However,	one	of	competing	approaches	to	libertarian	ethical	foundations	is	a	social	
contract	theory	which	has	been	adopted	by	a	Canadian	philosopher,	Jan	Narveson.	
Nevertheless	we	need	to	note	that	he	had	been	a	utilitarian	and	then	rejected	utilitar-
ianism	under	 the	 influence	of	philosophy	of	David	Gauthier	 and	Robert	Nozick.4 
1	 I	 identify	 libertarianism	 with	 so	 called	 deontological	 libertarianism	 and	 regard	 consequentialist	
argumentation as non essential to this political philosophy.
2 See e.g. M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty,	New	York,	New	York	University	Press,	1998,	and	
idem, For a New Liberty. The Libertarian Manifesto,	Second	Edition,	Auburn,	Alabama,	Ludwig	von	
Mises Institute, 2006.
3 For elaboration see ibidem;	 see	 also	 J.	 Narveson,	 The Libertarian Idea,	 Broadview	 Press,	
Peterborough, Ontario, 2001, p. 109, 193.
4 See ibidem, p.	XI.
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Narveson	is	pegged	as	one	of	the	most	important	figures	in	a	libertarian	movement,5 
but	his	contractarian	proposal	which	can	be	precisely	termed	“market	contractarian-
ism”,6 is very far from being a representative basis of libertarianism. Thus, it seems 
legitimate	to	scrutinize	his	novel	approach	and	answer	the	question	raised	in	the	sub-
title	of	this	chapter,	namely:	is	it	still	libertarianism?	The	question	will	be	answered	
in	the	final	section	of	the	chapter.
1. Assumptions
In	 his	 best-known	 book,	The Libertarian Idea, Narveson takes on the crucial 
question	 of	 what	 are	 the	 foundations	 of	 libertarianism.7 But his endeavour goes 
beyond	those	foundations:	“We	want	a	really	fundamental	answer	 to	 the	question	
why	one	should embrace, accept, adopt, or pay attention to any moral requirements, 
principles, or concerns”8—he states.
How	does	he	define	morality?	Thusly:	“the	normative	question	of	general	re-
lations	among	people:	how	we	are	to	relate	to	our	fellows”;9 “a set of internally 
monitored	controls	on	one’s	behaviour	as	it	relates	to	other	people”;10 “a regime 
of interpersonal behavioural control”11;	“a	set	of	requirements	that	will	make	us	
all better off if they are met by everyone—and that, accordingly, are liable to the 
problem	of	 defection	 by	 some	who	will	 try	 to	 take	 the	money	 and	 run”.12 Ac-
cording to John T. Sanders,13	Narveson	believes	that	morality	appears	only	when	
there	 is	 social	 interaction,	 opposed	 to	what	modern	 philosophers	 call	 the	 state	
of	nature.	Sander’s	view	is	in	line	with	the	definitions	cited	above,	but	we	must	
specify	 that	Narveson	also	uses	a	notion	of	personal	morality	which	he	defines	
as	“the	area	of	decisions	about	how	one	is	to	run	one’s	life,	the	ultimate	bases	on	
which	one	will	make	one’s	choices”.14 He claims that the personal sense of the 
5 Cf. D. M. Hausman, M. S. McPherson, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy, 
New	York,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006,	p.	168;	P.	Vallentyne,	Libertarianism, 2010, retrieved 24 
August 2012 from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/, 20. 07. 2010.
6 See S. Wein, “Reconciling Radicals: Market Contractarianism and Fundamentalist Utilitarianism”, 
in M. Murray (ed.), Liberty, Games and Contracts. Jan Narveson and the Defence of Libertarianism, 
Bodmin,	Cornwall,	Ashgate,	2007,	pp.	201-202.
7 See J. Narveson, op. cit., p. 105.
8 Ibidem, p. 107.
9 Ibidem, p. 105.
10 Idem, “Contracting for Liberty”, in T. R. Machan, D. B. Rasmussen (ed.), Liberty for the Twenty-
First Century. Contemporary Libertarian Thought,	Boston-London,	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	1995,	p.	21.
11 Idem, Social Contract, Game Theory and Liberty: Responding to My Critics, in M. Murray (ed.), 
op. cit., p. 238.
12 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 146.
13 J. T. Sanders, “Contracting Justice”, in M. Murray (ed.), op. cit., p. 22.
14 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 123.
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term “morality” includes its social meaning. Hence, personal morality is broader 
than social morality. 
Social morality is subject to “some rational constraints”.15 “In the social sense, 
morality is quite essential for the governance of people in general—of «society»” 
he adds.16 Insofar as a personal sense of morality is left up to a sovereign subject, 
the shape of the sort of morality regulating social issues requires referring to the 
community. According to Narveson, rules regarding society are determined by the 
values of individual people. In that case, he claims, the only possibility is that “those 
individual values support those social principles”.17
Social morality is implicit in personal morality, thus the actor is bound by so-
cial	morality,	so	he	 is	not	confined	 to	 the	 individualism	of	personal	morality.18 In 
Narveson’s	opinion	the	basis	of	morality	is	one’s	own	interest,	and	this	implies	that	
interests of the bargaining subjects constitute the basis of the social contract.19
It should be also noted that the philosopher distinguishes a group of “liberal in-
terests”.	Their	characteristic	is	that	they	are	not	designed	to	make	anyone	unsatisfied,	
therefore	Narveson	does	not	find	any	reason	to	object	the	pursuit	of	them.	Indeed,	
he	argues	that	through	free	exchange,	pursuing	one’s	own	satisfaction	improves	the	
situation	of	 the	other	as	well.	Voluntary	exchange	is	 the	optimal	social	 institution	
since	 it	maximizes	 the	 benefits	 gained	 by	 society.20 His position is characteristic 
to libertarianism and laissez faire (a radical free-market approach), nevertheless he 
uses this sort of argumentation not only to justify institution of contract, but the lib-
ertarian political philosophy in general.
In making his case, Narveson comments on positions of other philosophers 
who	work	in	an	intellectual	tradition	close	to	his	own	paradigm,	i.e.	of	John	Rawls,	
Thomas	Hobbes	and	David	Gauthier.	He	is	highly	inspired	by	the	works	of	Hobbes	
and	Gauthier,	especially	the	latter,	since	Narveson	adopts	a	similar	view	and	uses	it	
to present a novel approach to the foundations of libertarianism.21 He also accepts 
the standpoint of Hobbes that morality appears out of moral chaos (based on a rea-
soning of Vilfredo Pareto).22 The Canadian philosopher points out that: “The genius 
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
17 Ibidem,	pp.	167;	123-125.
18 See ibidem, pp. 167-168.
19 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit.,	p.	32;	idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 135, 146.
20 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit.,	p.	33;	see	also	E.	J.	Bond,	“Some	Remarks	on	the	Foundations	
of Libertarianism”, in M. Murray (ed.), op. cit., p. 11. We also need to note that, according to Narveson, 
a basis of morality is a game theory (J. Narveson, Social Contract..., op. cit.,	p.	222).	However,	this	
problem is not important for the aims of this chapter.
21 See idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit.,	pp.	XII—XIII.
22 Idem, “Why	 Liberty?”,	 in	T.	 Gizbert-Studnicki,	M.	Klinowski	 (eds.),	Law, liberty, morality and 
rights. 23rd World Congress of Legal and Social Philosophy 2007, Cracow,	Wolters	Kluwer	Polska,	
Warszawa,	2010,	p.	306.
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of	Hobbes	lies	in	the	fact	that	he	shows	how	politics	is	needed	even	if	none of the 
interests	at	the	ground-floor	level	are	themselves	political”.23 Finally, Narveson re-
fers	to	the	Prisoner’s	Dilemma	and	sums	up	that	his	position	is	somewhere	between	
the	view	of	Hobbes	who	proposes	an	institution	of	sovereign	as	a	supervisor	of	co-
operation	of	individuals,	and	of	Gauthier	who	emphasizes	a	tendency	of	individuals	
to	cooperation.	Narveson	accepts	the	view	of	Gauthier	who	presents	a	“constrained	
maximization”	which	is	opposite	to	“straight	maximization”	—	being	a	disposition	
to thievery. He also argues that Hobbes’s idea of creating government is illogical.24
When	 it	 comes	 to	Rawls	he	becomes	critical,	 although	not	because	of	Rawl’s	
anti-capitalist conclusions, since Narveson only addresses the stricte contractarian 
methodological aspect of the theory.25 In The Libertarian Idea he focuses on the 
Rawlsian	notion	of	a	“veil	of	ignorance”	and	claims	that	there	are	two	kinds:	“the-
oretically	dispensable”	and	“theoretically	indispensable.”	The	first	is	about	univer-
salism, and the second touches on impartiality and holds it as not the only feature of 
justice	since	it	should	also	feature	within	individuals.26 The philosopher rejects the 
second, strong kind of “veil”.27	He	suggests	that	the	approach	of	Rawls,	which	does	
not imply an existence of particular self-conscious individuals,28 is an intuitionist 
view	and	that	it	overlooks	the	aspect	of	contractarianism	which	Narveson	is	most	
interested	in,	namely	what	the	“veil	of	ignorance”	should	be	replaced	with.29 Here is 
the starting point in his search for a foundation for political theory.
Narveson rejects all moral theories based on intuition. He regards appealing to 
moral	intuitions	as	not	rational	and	claims	that	the	intuitionist	view	makes	rational	
agreement impossible.30	The	rejection	of	 intuition	also	applies	 to	 libertarians	who	
defend natural rights.31 It should be noted that Narveson seems to regard an appeal 
to intuition the sine qua non	of	natural	law	and	natural	rights.	He	proposes	a	con-
tractarian	approach	in	place	of	an	“intuitionist”	view,	rather	than	the	“natural	rights”	
view.32
Narveson’s	 standpoint	on	natural	 law	and	natural	 rights	 theory	 should	be	pre-
sented more precisely. On the one hand he assumes that different people can have 
different	opinions	on	what	is	the	basic	rule	of	human	nature	and	that	this	is	implied	
23 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit. p. 166.
24 Ibidem, pp. 139-143.
25 Cf. P. Przybysz, Modele teoretyczne w współczesnej filozofii politycznej liberalizmu,	Poznań,	Wyd.	
Naukowe	Uniwersytetu	im.	Adama	Mickiewicza,	2009.
26 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 13.
27 Ibidem, pp. 133-134.
28 It should be noted that this thesis is strongly polemic.
29 Ibidem, p. 156.
30 See ibidem:	p.	XI,	109,	122;	broadly	on	Narveson’s	claims	on	intuitionism	see	ibidem, pp. 108-121.
31 Ibidem,	p.	XI,	56,	109.
32 Ibidem,	p.	XIII.
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by the possibility of adhering to different ethical systems. The above is the reason 
why	he	 associates	natural	 law	with	 intuitionism	and	 rejects	 it.	He	emphasizes	 an	
instrumental character of morals, pointing out that it needs to be attractive to people 
and criticizing natural rights theorists for disregarding it. Furthermore he notes that 
“the	claim	that	some	view	is	«based	on	the	nature	of	things»	or	on	«human	nature»	
is	unclear.	Talk	of	«conforming	to	nature»	makes	no	literal	sense;	nature	simply	is.	
It	sets	limits	to	what	is	possible,	but	can	prescribe	nothing”.33 He also claims that 
neither	St.	Thomas	Aquinas	nor	 John	Locke	did	clarify	what	 the	natural	 law	 is.34 
Additionally,	he	finds	it	ironic	that	even	among	theorists	appealing	to	natural	rights	
theory	we	can	observe	significant	differences.35	However,	it	is	worth	to	notice	that	
such	a	critique	of	the	theory	was	persuasively	rejected	by	Murray	N.	Rothbard	who	
pointed	out	that	ceasing	to	study	a	natural	law	theory	because	of	different	proposi-
tions	made	by	some	thinkers	would	be	an	absurdity.36
Nevertheless,	Narveson	does	not	dissent	from	natural	law	theory	completely.	He	
argues	that	contractarianism	can	be	merged	with	one	kind	of	it.37 According to him, 
“a	natural	law	theory	should	say,	in	the	end,	that	in	view	of	the	way	things	and	people	
are, subscribing to this set of rules or virtues is our best means of accommodating 
them”.38 In effect, the philosopher tries to bridge his contractarian idea and the nat-
ural	law	claiming	that	some	rule	or	value	can	be	described	as	“natural,”	when	it	is	
the best rational solution39	which	can	be	found	by	a	concrete	person	in	a	concrete	
situation. He refers to Hobbes in this matter,40	but	we	can	also	perceive	here	a	view	
of	a	German	thinker,	Samuel	Pufendorf	who	regarded	a	social	contract	as	directly	
implied	by	natural	law.	In	Narveson’s	opinion,	law	could	be	defined	as	natural	be-
cause	of	the	fact	of	being	“acknowledged,	recognized,	or	employed	implicitly	as	a	
canon of interpersonal criticism of behavior”.41	Thus,	he	claims	that	we	could	define	
as natural some parts of game theory used in the contractarian approach such as fa-
mous Prisoner’s Dilemma.42
However,	when	it	comes	to	libertarianism,	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	the-
ory	derived	from	human	nature	is	not	just	natural	law,	but	rights	stemming	from	it,	
33 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit.,	p.	20.	In	these	words	Narveson	refers	to	a	famous	“Hume’s	
guillotine” and so called the “is-ought” problem.
34 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
35 Idem, Why Liberty?, op. cit.,	pp.	298-299;	see	also	idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 44, 109.
36 See M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of..., op. cit., pp. 10-11.
37 J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 20.
38 Ibidem.
39	In	a	Weberian	sense	of	a	goal-oriented	rational	action	in	the	compliance	with	game	theory.
40 Ibidem. As	a	philosopher	who	appeals	to	Hobbes	and	Locke,	Narveson	is	very	interested	
in	the	idea	of	the	state	of	nature	which	he	touches	on	repeatedly.
41 Ibidem, pp. 149-150.
42	 On	 this	 see	 M.	 Modrzejewska,	 Libertariańskie koncepcje jednostki i państwa we współczesnej 
amerykańskiej myśli politycznej,	Kraków,	Wyd.	UJ,	2010,	pp.	112-115.
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that	is,	natural	rights.	It	is	this	crucial	idea	of	libertarianism	which	Narveson	regards	
as	intuitionist,	hence	flawed.43
On	the	one	hand	Narveson	mentions	that	he	finally	remains	unconvinced	of	the	
validity	of	the	idea	of	natural	law,44 but on the other hand he argues in the context 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Wherever the structure of preferences of the different parties is clear to both parties 
(and	it	is	not	always),	we	have	a	basis	for	a	rule	of	precisely	that	kind:	a	natural	basis	
for	a	moral	rule,	in	fact.	(…)	So	understood,	we	may	accept	the	idea	of	natural	law	
nearly enough. What its relation to political structures may be is, of course, another 
question,	and	the	main	question	dealt	with	in	this	book.45 
Hence,	although	Narveson	does	not	value	a	natural	 law	 intuition,	he	 seems	 to	
endeavour	to	gain	acceptance	even	of	that	group	of	thinkers	whose	paradigm	is	the	
natural	 law	 theory.	He	 also	 touches	 on	 the	 field	while	 considering	 an	 agreement	
preceding a social contract establishing a free-market order. The aim of this “prior 
agreement” is to establish property rights and “this fundamental agreement can rea-
sonably also be held to consist in the determination of «natural» rights”.46	As	we	
can see, Narveson mentions here not the natural law, but natural rights.	However,	
we	should	not	forget	that	in	his	opinion	cognition	of	rights	is	not	a	task	of	“sound	
reason,” but that they are subject to a contractarian procedure, hence they cannot be 
described as natural in a strict sense.
It	seems	then	that	in	Narveson’s	theory	there	is	only	one	natural	law:	a	contract	
leading to a social order implied by the “Liberty Principle.” So it is an impersonal 
law,	 and	Narveson’s	 assumption	 is	 a	kind	of	 “impersonal	 egoism”	which	we	can	
also	find	in	the	capitalist	philosophy	of	Eric	Mack.47 This idea reads that objectively 
everyone	follows	their	own	interest	and	by	using	instrumental	rationality	should	(if	
they understand that “the Liberty Principle” is optimally best for each and every 
person) enter into agreement constituting laissez-faire capitalism. Thus egoism is to 
be	an	anthropological	aspect	of	natural	law	a	la	Narveson.
2.	Social	contract:	justification,	procedure,	motives
Narveson adopts contractarianism as a starting point for establishing a social or-
der, because of an obvious observation that people opt for different ethical doctrines. 
43 See J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 56.
44 Ibidem, p. 150.
45 Ibidem;	see	also ibidem, p. 198.
46 Ibidem, p. 193.
47 See D. Gordon, “Contemporary Currents in Libertarian Political Philosophy”, in Literature of 
Liberty. A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought, 4, 1 (Spring), 1981, pp. 16-20.
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He is interested in such an arrangement of social institutions that excludes coercion, 
that is, an arrangement that could be accepted by everyone.48 Thus the most impor-
tant	advantage	of	contractarianism	is	that	it	is	aimed	at	“generat[ing]	moral	princi-
ples for societies out of the nonmoral values of individuals”.49
Narveson	argues	that	actions	of	some	people	are	not	always	valuable	from	the	
point	of	view	of	others.	A	rational	approach	to	this	matter	is	to	consider	the	way	of	
affecting	a	conjuncture	so	that	acts	of	some	people	against	acts	of	others	were	as	pos-
itive as possible (or at least just neutral). Recognizing an act as positive depends on 
one’s	attitude	towards	the	ends	of	everybody	else.	The	point	is	that	everyone	could	
enjoy the highest level of liberty. We cannot just ignore people choosing ends in op-
position	to	the	ends	of	their	fellowmen,	because	we	cannot	remain	indifferent	to,	for	
example, a knife attack.  Possible responses may include trickery or force.50 Then 
“the	agent	takes	the	other	persons	in	his	environment	as	fixed	entities,	not	amenable	
to	rational	influence”.51 As an alternative Narveson presents a “strategic” approach 
which	he	describes	as	follows:	“we	attempt	to	improve	the	situation	by	establishing	
some	kind	of	communication	with	the	other	parties,	in	the	course	of	which	we	sup-
ply information to them about our likely response to possible actions of theirs, and 
they	in	turn	communicate	an	intention	to	respond	to	your	response	in	one	way	or	
another”.52	He	justifies	it	with	a	quotation	from	Hobbes:	“as	to	strength	of	body,	the	
weakest	hath	enough	to	kill	the	strongest”.53 
But	choosing	a	particular	“strategy”	proves	to	be	a	far	more	difficult	task.	There	
are	two	sorts	of	strategies.	The	first	is	based	on	using	or	threatening	force	in	order	
to	 influence	someone’s	actions—the	strategy	of	 the	stick.	While	 the	second	is	 the	
strategy	of	the	carrot	which	means	that	one	person	announces	that	he	will	perform	
an	action	that	is	favourable	to	another	person,	if	that	person	chooses	to	act	in	a	way	
which	is	more	beneficial	to	the	proponent.54 According to Narveson, choosing the 
first	strategy	requires	hostility	toward	all	encountered	people.	Appealing	to	the	carrot	
is	a	demonstration	of	being	open	to	beneficial	or	at	least	neutral	relations	with	others.	
Narveson	emphasizes	 that	 the	first	 strategy	does	not	fit	 libertarianism.55 A crucial 
aspect of a social contract is mutuality56—a Hobbesian manner of reasoning.
48 J. Narveson, Why Liberty?, op. cit., pp. 298-300.
49 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 167.
50 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
51 Ibidem, p. 22.
52  Ibidem.
53 Quoted in ibidem.
54	However,	what	 stays	 unsolved	 is	 the	 problem	of	 negative	 externalities	 (I	 am	 indebted	 to	Danny	
Frederick for this point). 
55 Ibidem, pp. 22-23.
56 See J. T. Sanders, op. cit., p. 22.
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The ideas of the Canadian philosopher are structured in a formal contractarian 
procedure	which	consists	of	two	levels.	The	first	is	the	assumption	that	individuals	
who	are	members	of	a	given	community	(Narveson	uses	a	rather	inadequate	notion	
of “polis”) vary in values and try to justify them. The difference in opinions of par-
ticular individuals on values underlies a need of morals and/or politics to come to 
existence.	The	second	part	of	the	contractarian	procedure	is	stricter	than	the	first.	It	
requires the values of the individuals not to be a barrier to the possibility of cooper-
ation—a	requirement	that	is	not	always	fulfilled.	Where	which	there	is	no	place	for	
politics,	instead	there	is	violence,	chaos	and	war.57
It appears to be for this reason that Narveson raises a necessity of the aforemen-
tioned	“prior	agreement”	or	“pre-market	bargaining”	(which	notion	he	takes	from	
Jules Coleman). It is about a conventional establishing or regularizing an institution 
of	private	property	which	is	the	basis	of	justice.	Following	John	Gray,	he	regards	this	
approach as a representative for a Hobbesian style contractarianism,58 but in this 
respect	we	can	also	observe	a	similarity	to,	for	example,	David	Hume.	According	to	
Hume, establishing property rights is a basis of justice, and these rights, and hence 
justice itself, are conventional matters.
We	should	also	draw	attention	to	the	relation	between	a	social	contract	and	a	con-
tract as such. Both involve “the reciprocal conditionalizing of behavior” and oblige 
those	who	are	the	subjects	of	the	contract.59	However,	the	most	important	is	that	a	
“social contract” (Narveson himself uses inverted commas) is “an unspoken under-
standing, a non-negotiated	 agreement—an	 agreement	 in	 action,	 not	 in	words	 nor	
preceded	by	words”.60 Narveson also clearly dissents from the idea that a social con-
tract is the historical origin of the state.61 “The Grand Social Contract is, obviously, 
a	model	or	idealisation	of	some	kind”—he	writes.62 Thus the philosopher is one of 
those	contractarian	theorists	who	use	the	social	contract	theory	in	a	broader,	not	lit-
eral, sense.63	Jean	Hampton	describes	them	in	these	words:	“Hence,	thinking	about	
‘what	we	could	all	agree	to’	allows	us	to	construct	a	deduction	of	practical	reason	to	
determine	what	policies	are	mutually	advantageous”.64	It	is	in	full	consonance	with	
the approach of Narveson.
Considering	 the	way	 of	 “concluding”	 a	 “contract”	 in	 such	 a	 form,	 the	 author	
of The Libertarian Idea	claims:	“Each	party	[of	a	contract]	adopts	a	disposition	to	
57 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 164.
58 Ibidem, p. 193.
59 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 25.
60 Ibidem.
61 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 132.
62 As quoted in J. T. Sanders, op. cit., p. 21.
63 See J. Hampton, “Contract and Consent”, in R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit, T. Pogge (eds.), A Companion 
to Contemporary Political Philosophy,	vol.	II,	2nd	Edition,	Blackwell	Publishing,	2007,	pp.	482-483.
64 Ibidem,	p.	484;	see	also	J.	T.	Sanders,	op. cit., p. 25.
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respond	in	ways	that	make	the	resulting	interaction	mutually	preferable	to	its	alter-
natives.	Such	dispositions	are	moral	virtues	(…).	But	the	contractarian	view	differs	
from	theories	claiming	to	found	morals	on	a	prior	discernment	of	what	is	virtuous,	
independently of interaction”.65
Since virtue is a particular disposition, i.e. a behavioural element of an attitude of 
a subject66, it means that he or she is possesses a virtue as far back as on a level of 
thinking,	what	in	some	measure	shifts	the	burden	of	bravery	from	an	act	to	a	dispo-
sition. It is a quite uncommon approach to the case of virtue. Narveson also claims 
that	a	virtuousness	of	this	disposition	is	not	known	a priori, but a posteriori.67 Thus, 
he	must	aim	at	underlying	the	difference	between	his	contractarianism,	which	is	to	
be	persuasive	 to	all	because	of	 its	profitability,	 and	 the	position	of	 “intuitionists”	
who—as	Narveson	believes—develop	some	patterns	of	virtuous	action,	but	lack	the	
justification	which	could	convince	everyone.	
He also points out that the contractarian theory is not restricted to the theory 
of	enforceable	duties,	that	is,	of	narrowly	understood	justice.	He	argues	that	when	
people	choose	the	aforementioned	strategy	of	the	carrot	in	the	case	of	welfare,	they	
equally	choose	promoting	welfare	of	everyone	else.	It	is	a	public	attitude	which	nev-
ertheless	is	not	very	costly.	“We	do	not	take	on	a	great	burden	when	we	agree	that	
(…)	it	is	a	better	thing	that	Jones	or	Smith	do	well	than	badly,	and	to	be	disposed	
— but not conscripted — to lend an occasional hand or an occasional dollar if need 
be”.68	One	can	read	these	words	as	an	encouragement	to	something	like	an	altruistic	
ethos in a free market institutional order.
An important part of Narveson’s argumentation is the problem of motives for 
becoming a part of a social contract. He states succinctly: “The social contract pro-
posal	is	that	it	is	worth	paying	the	price	of	nonviolence	toward	others	in	return	for	
nonviolence from them”.69 The most important thing about contractarianism is to 
derive such a proposal that everyone could reasonably agree to.70 Such an offer is 
“the	Liberty	Principle”	which	is	“the	best	moral	outlook	from	the	point	of	view	of	
Everyman”.71 “What makes it best, I claim, is that this is the principle that could 
rationally	be	expected	to	maximize	the	individual’s	return	from	society,	as	it	were.	
Libertarianism incurs the least costs of such theories, and makes possible the greatest 
benefit”—claims	Narveson.72 
65 J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 25.
66 See E. Aronson, T. D. Wilson, R. M. Akert, Social Psychology, 8th Edition, Cloth, Pearson, 2013, 
chapter 7.
67 J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 25.
68 Ibidem, pp. 37-38.
69 Idem, Why Liberty?, op. cit., p. 309.
70 Ibidem,	p.	310;	idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 132.
71 Idem, Why Liberty?, op. cit., p. 299.
72 Ibidem.
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In The Libertarian Idea	he	confidently	argues	that	any	other	approach	to	moral-
ity	cannot	reconcile	people	who	opt	for	various	ideas	of	individual	good.	However	
everybody	needs	morality,	for	everybody	can	be	robbed	and	cooperation	with	others	
is	 beneficial	 for	 everyone.73	Therefore,	 a	mutual	benefit	 consists	 in	 a	 rejection	of	
using	force	while	pursuing	our	ends	and	in	guarantying	a	social	consolidation	of	a	
value of interpersonal agreements. Narveson emphasizes that expecting others to 
meet those conditions is rational and so is the very commitment.74 A contract meets 
a	condition	of	rationality	when	it	 is	oriented	on	 improving	a	situation	of	all	parts	
thereof.	The	 same	goes	 for	 a	general	 rule,	 regulating	 social	 relations—when	 it	 is	
aimed	at	benefiting	all,	its	adoption	is	justified.75
But	what	 is	 the	way	of	adopting	this	regulative	rule?	Narveson	opts	for	an	ar-
ranged	morality,	a	deliberate	morality	which	is	to	be	established	by	the	use	of	rea-
son.76 Crucially, he states that his idea of morality can be accepted only by those 
who	are	rational	themselves.77 What about the rest? He appeals to Hobbes and an-
swers	that	when	somebody	does	not	want	to	“accede”	to	the	social	contract,	the	oth-
ers	cannot	do	anything.	“If	in	the	process	they	end	up	on	the	gallows	or	in	the	tar-pit,	
that’s tough for them—but it is not unjust”.78
But does contractarian technique assure adopting “the Libertarian Principle”? In 
Narveson’s	opinion,	it	does.	He	argues	that	to	answer	this	question,	we	need	to	real-
ize	that:	firstly,	a	social	contract	is	adopted	voluntarily;	secondly,	“the	idea	of	liber-
tarianism is to maximize individual freedom by accounting each person’s person as 
that	person’s	own	property, that is, by giving each person the maximal level of rights 
to the disposition of that particular bit of «property» (…)”.79 Narveson believes that 
supporting libertarianism should be of a prima facie character and that one cannot 
dispute the necessary libertarian implications of the social contract (Narveson deals 
with	the	problem	in	detail	in	the	third	part	of	The Libertarian Idea).80 Contractarian 
libertarianism (or libertarian contractarianism) lies in adopting a universal social 
contract	that	allows	pursuing	one’s	own	ends	without	using	force	in	relations	with	
others.81	One	can	conclude	that	the	contract	becomes	an	objectivised	structure	which	
affects individual choices and thereby loses its intrapersonal sense, and becomes an 
impersonal	(structured)	force	affecting	relations	between	people.
73 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 149.
74 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 24.
75 Ibidem, p. 30.
76 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., pp. 125-126.
77 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 25.
78 Ibidem, p. 23.
79 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 176.
80 Ibidem, p. 177.
81 Idem, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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3. Critics vs. Narveson
Although	Narveson	is	not	an	unknown	author,	his	writing	has	not	been	widely	
discussed	so	far.	However,	there	is	one	exception	which	is	his	festschrift.82 Against 
possible suppositions that such a form is not a good opportunity to criticize ideas of 
an	academic	to	whom	the	festschrift	is	dedicated,	in	this	case	analyses	of	Narveson’s	
work	do	not	differ	 from	standard	philosophical	or	 scientific	analyses.	 Indeed,	 the	
volume consists of response of the author of The Libertarian Idea,	 and	owing	 to	
this an explicit philosophical discourse is created. Some of the chapters correspond 
with	problems	of	this	chapter,	hence	it	seems	worth	to	point	out	some	remarks	of	
commentators.
Tibor	R.	Machan	criticizes	the	very	basis	of	Narveson’s	project	which	means	he	
deflates	a	social	contract	as	a	valid	source	of	morality.	Being	a	proponent	of	a	tele-
ological natural rights theory83, Machan argues that a “social compact”84 does not 
suffice.	He	believes	that	an	agreement	proposed	by	contractarians	must	be	preceded	
by	referring	to	logically	prior	ethical	principles	which	are	not	a	matter	of	convention;	
or to an idea of natural drives of human being, such as, for example, self-preserva-
tion.85	Moreover,	if	we	believe	that	human	beings	have	some	common	features,	for	
example, that they are “sovereign agents and their agency is a precondition of a mor-
al life,” then the features cannot appear only as a consequence of a social contract. 
It	 is	a	contract	what	must	be	concluded	according	 to	 those	assumptions,	not	vice	
versa.86	In	this	context	Machan	also	touches	on	the	another	problem.	He	states:	“[N]
othing	follows	from	everyone	concerned	promising	to	abide	by	some	guidelines	un-
less	promises	themselves	have	normative	significance.	And	this	cannot	derive	from	
a	still	prior	compact,	ad	infinitum”.87 Another serious objection is that an irrational 
social contract is not morally binding.88 Thus rules adopted in a social agreement are 
not	necessarily	morally	binding.	“[W]ho	would	morally	blame	someone	who	(…)	
decided to violate the norms of the Nazi Party?”—he asks rhetorically.89 He also 
points	out	that	it	is	Narveson	who	requires	parties	of	a	contract	to	possess	a	feature	
of	reasonability,	but	then—as	Machan	shows—in	the	case	of	an	agreement	as such, 
82 See M. Murray, op. cit.
83 See e.g. T. R. Machan, “Are Teleological Rights Theories Utilitarian”, Cato Journal 7, 1 (spring/
summer), 1987.
84	He	prefers	this	term	to	a	“social	contract”;	see	more	in	idem, “Is Agreement Enough?”, in M. Murray 
(ed.), op. cit.
85 Ibidem,	p.	33;	cf.	W.	Kymlicka,	“The	Social	Contract	Tradition”,	in	P.	Singer	(ed.),	A Companion to 
Ethics,	Oxford,	Wiley-Blackwell,	1993,	pp.	186-188.
86 T. R. Machan, Is Agreement Enough?, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
87 Ibidem, p. 33.
88 Ibidem, p. 34.
89 Ibidem, p. 35.
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including a social contract, this normative requirement does not form a constitutive 
attribute.90	Machan	is	against	scorning	(writing	off)	those	who	would	turn	out	not	to	
be reasonable/rational to take part in a tacit social contract.91 He is prone to recog-
nize	as	justified	an	enlightenment	variant	of	a	social	contract	instead	of	that	which	
has	been	developed	since	the	nineteenth	century	and	which	Narveson	argues	for.92
Responding to this critique, Narveson93 argues that every contract implies an ob-
ligation	of	obeying	it,	but	it	is	in	contradiction	with	his	view	in	The Libertarian Idea. 
For	in	his	most	important	work	he	is	far	closer	to	the	position	of	Machan.	Appealing	
to	David	Hume,	he	admits	that	the	very	giving	one’s	word	does	not	imply	a	norma-
tiveness of a contract. As he states: “To account for the obligation to keep promises 
on the basis of a general promise to	do	so	seems,	shall	we	say,	unpromising”.94 Nev-
ertheless Narveson tries to extricate from this problematic situation by pointing out 
that the contract he proposes is not a literal one.95	However,	we	should	regard	this	
position	as	an	unclear	methodological	quibble	which	does	not	solve	the	problem,	for	
Narveson	still	does	not	give	the	answer	for	the	question	of	the	basis	of	normative	va-
lidity	of	a	contract.	Nevertheless,	the	situation	changes	if	we	recognize,	that	despite	
the fact that Narveson does not raise it in his response for Machan’s critique, he does 
introduce an anthropological idea of the man’s pursuit of self-preservation96	which,	
according to Machan, is enough to recognize the validity of the contractarian theory 
of agreement. 
On the other hand, Machan is right in opposing Narveson’s requirement of rea-
sonability/rationality.	The	objection	will	be	of	a	fundamental	importance	in	an	ad-
judication of the philosophy of the Canadian thinker from a libertarian perspective.
Another	critical	view	which	corresponds	with	the	subject	of	this	chapter	is	pre-
sented	by	Sanders	(who	has	already	been	cited	above).	He	faults	Narveson	for	sim-
ilar	mistakes	which	Narveson	himself	addresses	to	Rawls.	The	point	is	duplicating	
the	 approach	 of	Rawls	 in	 ignoring	 “particular	 humans	 in	 particular	 circumstanc-
es”97	within	 the	 contractarian	 framework.	Also	Leo	Groarke98 criticizes Narveson 
for	adopting	a	similar	approach	to	Rawls	in	respect	of	making	an	unreal	assumption	
90 Ibidem, p. 40.
91 Ibidem,	pp.	40-41;	45	n.	26.
92 See W. Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 186-188.
93 J. Narveson, Social Contract..., op. cit., p. 220.
94 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit.,	p.	132;	cf.	M.	N.	Rothbard,	The Ethics of..., op. cit.,	pp.	79-80;	
H.-H. Hoppe, “The Role of Intellectuals and Anti-Intellectual Intellectuals”, in idem, The Great Fiction. 
Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Baltimore, Maryland, Laissez Faire Books, 
2012.
95 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 132.
96 Ibidem, p. 147.
97 J. T. Sanders, op.cit., p. 29.
98 L. Groarke, “Does Scepticism Beget Libertarianism? A Response to Narveson on Reason, Morality 
and Politics”, in M. Murray (ed.), op. cit.
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on the original position. Groarke defends moral intuitions of people and opposes 
the	 requirement	of	 forgoing	 those	 intuitions	within	a	 contractarian	procedure.	He	
promotes	a	different	contractarian	theory	which	would	enable	people	to	keep	their	
intuitions and beliefs, being the source of their identities. 
Narveson responds that it is impossible to take into consideration both the in-
terests	 and	 the	moral	 views	 of	 actors,	 since	 the	moral	 views	 are	 incomparable.99 
Groarke does not assume that they are, yet he sees a chance for a compromise. An-
yway,	Narveson	does	not.	Groarke	asks,	“whether	individuals	who	have	convictions	
founded on strong moral and/or political intuitions should feel compelled to accept 
the	 conditions	 of	 the	 contract-making	 situation	which	Narveson	 proposes”.100 He 
incisively argues that libertarians-intuitionists could adopt the aforementioned pro-
posal,	provided	that	they	would	find	it	convincing.	Indeed,	he	rightly	points	that	then	
they	would	not	be	“true	Narvesonians,”	since	they	would	hold	their	intuitions	and	
would	agree	with	Narveson	only	in	terms	of	a	political	order	(prescinding	here	from	
differences	between	anarchocapitalism	and	minarchism).	Nevertheless,	he	is	prone	
to believe that if libertarians recognize that Narveson’s proposal based on rational 
self-interest	does	not	 lead	 to	 laissez	 faire,	 then	 they	would	confine	 themselves	 to	
their intuitions. It seems trivial, but as is often in philosophy this seeming triviality 
underlies a strong thesis: “it is these intuitions, not an appeal to rational self-interest 
which	is	the	real	basis	of	libertarianism”.101
We	can	quote	a	standpoint	of—as	Narveson	would	say—a	libertarian-intuition-
ist,	Machan:	“[I]t	is	not	sufficient	to	learn	of	the	true	principles	of	justice;	it	is	also	
vital	to	apply	them,	and	that	would	not	be	possible	without	widespread	agreement	
— namely, a social compact or contract”.102 He conceives contractarianism only as 
a tool stabilizing a political order, and not as its philosophical foundation. For this 
is	the	role	of	natural	law.	A	social	contract	which	Machan	admits	can	be	associated	
with	 the	 third	 stage	 of	 contractarianism	 in	 the	 theory	 of	German	 thinker	 Samuel	
Pufendorf. After establishing that society is a subject of rights and choosing a politi-
cal system, he expected society to voluntarily subject to the rule of the government. 
This	 is	what	we	 can	 say	 about	 libertarians’	 possible	 acceptance	 of	 a	 contractari-
an	proposal.	As	regards	supporters	of	other	moral	views,	Groarke	is	very	sceptical,	
since contractarianism of Narveson requires very much from those people.103
However,	does	Narveson	indeed,	as	Groarke	believes,	require	from	people	to	for-
go their intuitions? Does this postulate concern an impoverishment of their identity? 
A	positive	 answer	 to	 these	questions	would	be	wrong.	Answering	 the	objections,	
99 J. Narveson, Social Contract..., op. cit., p. 222.
100 L. Groarke, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
101 Ibidem, p. 52.
102 T. R. Machan, Is Agreement Enough?, op. cit., p. 44.
103 L. Groarke, op. cit., p. 52.
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Narveson104 points out: “On the contrary: accepting people as they are is the begin-
ning	of	wisdom	in	this	business”.	Of	course,	in	the	following	sentences	we	can	read	
again that taking into consideration not only interests, but also individual intuitions, 
is not feasible.105 Nevertheless, it does not mean that people are to forget their intui-
tions. Narveson does not mean an individual life of a man, but the basics of a politi-
cal order. Not a personal morality, but a social one. He proposes to establish the latter 
contractually	and	only	 in	 this	regard	he	proposes	forgoing	moral	 intuitions	which	
interfere	with	views	of	others	and	which	would	interfere	with	a	possible	agreement	
of each and every contractor on a political system (on a common social morality). He 
tries to object a possible situation that one person could try to impose his or her in-
tuitions on that matter on the other person and vice versa. Thus, you can be yourself 
fully, you can fully realize your subjectivity, provided that you do it outside social 
issues,	outside	a	political	system,	hence	in	a	sphere	which	is	free	from	coercion.	It	is	
about the aforementioned liberal interests. Generally speaking it is then about Her-
bert	Spencer’s	 “Law	of	Equal	Freedom.”	As	Narveson	argues:	 “Contractarianism	
claims	to	find	a	basis	in	everyone’s	practical	reason	for	accepting	a	set	of	norms	call-
ing for restriction on people’s activities in pursuit of their various values”.106 Hence, 
a reconciliation of different intuitions is impossible in the area of politics (and mo-
rality—regarding	 so	 called	 social	morality),	where	 one	needs	 to	 ultimately	 adopt	
some particular standpoint underlying an institutional, political order. According to 
conditions of a contract one can freely realize all of one’s moral intuitions regarding 
the	individual	sphere	of	life	and	that	part	of	interpersonal	relations	which	is	free	of	
interference by a coercive apparatus. Therefore, in a response to remarks of Groarke, 
Narveson states that no other idea, apart from the libertarian one—as he understands 
it—promotes	“humanity”	as	much,	which	is	due	to	the	fundamental	importance	of	
liberty	of	the	individual	conceived	of	as	the	maximum	liberty	of	the	individual	while	
protecting	equal	 liberty	 for	 the	 rest.	He	firmly	 rejects	Groarke’s	objection	 that	he	
promotes	a	“narrow	and	constricted”	approach	to	human	nature.107 Narveson’s ex-
planations enable us to recognize objections of the critic as to some extent irrelevant, 
but there is no doubt that the issues are still open to the discussion.
Nevertheless,	it	seems	that	Groarke	is	right	when	he	doubts	such	a	high	inclusive	
potential	of	Narveson’s	contractarianism	which	the	Canadian	theorist	attributes	to	
it.	Even	 if	everyone	 is	 ready	 to	 forgo	 their	 intuitions	 (while	deliberating	 the	con-
tract),	what	about	their	views	which	they	regard	as	non-intuitionist	and	objective?	
Or,	views	fulfilling	epistemological	conditions,	e.g.	intersubjective	communication	
and	intersubjective	verification?	The	question	replaces	the	emphasis	on	intuitionism	
104 J. Narveson, Social Contract..., op. cit., p. 222.
105 Ibidem.
106 Ibidem.
107 Ibidem.
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as a meta-ethical standpoint in a broader, epistemological sense. We should keep in 
mind	that	there	are	different	philosophical	doctrines	or,	to	speak	narrower,	episte-
mological	ones	which	are	supported	by	some	authors	who	additionally	receive	wide	
recognition. What about solipsists, methodological collectivists, Hegelists? What 
about supporters of a myth in Georges Sorel’s variant? Or, libertarian adherents of 
natural	rights	and/or	apriorists-deductionists	who	consider	self-ownership	(or	even	
the	right	to	self-ownership)	as	certain	as	night	follows	day?	They	themselves	could	
regard Narveson’s ideas as intuitionist, just like he does regarding their ideas. Hence, 
from	a	point	of	view	of	at	least	some	theorists,	it	could	be	Narveson	who	may	be	
called on to forgo his—as they could also say—intuitions. It is then a mistake to 
ignore the fact that there are different ontological and epistemological standpoints in 
philosophy.	It	may	be	impossible	to	get	everybody	to	believe	that	all	views	except	
Narveson’s	are	intuitionist,	that	is,	in	principle	worse	and	deserving	relinquishment,	
subjective.	Moreover,	it	is	worth	to	quote	a	philosopher	of	science,	Monika	Walczak,	
who	points	out	with	reference	to	Stanisław	Judycki:	“They	attribute	to	an	aprioristic	
factor of intuition such functions of cognition as: understanding (a content) of terms, 
understanding propositional contents (judgements), identifying relations of sense, 
grasping	different	relations	(including	those	between	judgements)	or	an	intellectual	
perceiving value of something—all such acts of reason are called intuitional acts”.108 
Thus	an	intuition	is	connected	with	apriorism	not	more	than	with	any	other	episte-
mological standpoint.109
Even forgoing one’s intuitions during a contractarian procedure is not a guaran-
tee of consensus. Since there is ethical pluralism (Narveson opts for relativism in 
personal	morality),	there	is	also	pluralism	in	the	field	of	epistemology,	ontology	or	
anthropology.	It	is	not	only	ethics	where	we	differ.	Our	differences	extend	to	other	
philosophical	issues	which	Narveson	implicitly	assumes	as	unquestionable.	
As quoted above, Groarke objects the requirement of forgoing intuitions and be-
liefs.	According	to	Narveson,	a	belief	is	indeed	an	intuition.	And	if	his	own	beliefs	
are	not	intuitions,	what	are	they?	He	seems	to	argue:	“when	you	claim	something,	
what	I	do	not,	your	view	is	intuitionist,	so	it	should	be	forgone.	Instead,	what	I	claim	
is not an intuition, it is the truth”. Thereby he runs the risk of being perceived in re-
lations	with	other	philosophers	(except	Gauthier,	Hobbes	and,	perhaps,	a	few	others)	
as the philosopher among the prisoners of Plato’s cave.
108	 M.	 Walczak,	 “Aprioryzm	 i	 intuicja”,	 in	 G.	 Żurkowska,	 S.	 Blandzki	 (eds.),	 Rezonujący rozum 
nauki a rozumność intuicji,	Nowa	Wieś	 k/Torunia,	Bydgoszcz,	Warszawa,	Wydawnictwo	Rolewski	
&Wydawnictwo	Uczelniane	WSG	&	Wydawnictwo	IFiS	PAN,	2009,	p.	221.
109 Ibidem;	see	also	A.	Chmielewski,	„Racjonalizm	i	antyracjonalizm”,	in	J.	Miklaszewska	(ed.),	Rozum 
a porządek społeczny,	Instytut	Filozofii	—	Uniwersytet	Jagielloński,	Kraków,	2002,	p.	43.
Paweł Nowakowski Contractarian Libertarianism of Jan Narveson...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas 
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 561-582
577
4. Is the Contractarianism of Narveson Libertarianism?
Besides such objections, authors of the festschrift of Narveson distance them-
selves from the thesis of the Canadian philosopher that contractarianism leads to 
a libertarian system.110	However,	it	needs	to	be	noted	that	the	very	approach	to	the	
contractarian-libertarian	relation,	which	has	been	adopted	by	Narveson	and	some	of	
his	commentators,	is	dubious.	Since	the	thing	is	not	whether	contractarianism	leads	
or	can	lead	to	libertarianism,	but	whether	a	variant	of	a	social	contract	proposed	by	
Narveson is libertarianism. 
Libertarianism is a holistic strand in political philosophy. It is not a set of ideas 
“starting” at the moment of choosing a political system. Rather libertarianism is a 
complete structure built upon the cornerstones of ontology, epistemology, anthropol-
ogy and ethics. Libertarian philosophy assumes a particular ontological status of the 
world	and	of	a	man.	Ontological	(combined	with	epistemological)	ideas	of	human	
being lead to an axiological ideas of their status. This is a background of libertarian-
ism	which	a	libertarian	philosopher	possesses	when	he	starts	his	ethical/political	rea-
soning. Namely, the background is an idea of an individual as a subject of rights.111 
Hence,	we	should	not	ask	if	Narveson’s	contractarianism	leads	to	libertarianism,	but	
if	his	variant	of	contractarianism	is	consistent	with	libertarianism.
One of the main ideas of libertarianism is voluntariness.112 Appealing to this cat-
egory could serve as an another argument for regarding Narveson’s ideas as libertar-
ian. Within his social contract tradition a voluntariness of contracting parties, even 
if hypothetical, is crucial—to arise or explain social morality, duties (even if only 
negative	ones)	towards	others,	to	create	law,	society	and	the	state.	However,	when	
libertarians appeal to voluntariness, they already accept the particular starting point 
regarding	anthropology	and	ethics.	Thus	they	assume	the	right	to	self-ownership	and	
the non-aggression principle. As a result, strictly normative attributes and rights de-
rived from them comprise an ontological structure of human being and this structure 
is not dependent on relations or contracts they reach. 
110 See S. Dimock, “The Value of Values: The Importance of Autonomy in Contractarian Reasoning”, 
in M. Murray (ed.), op. cit.;	M.	Murray,	“Why	Contractarians	Are	Not	Libertarians...	Evolutionarily	
Speaking”, in ibidem;	L.	Groarke,	op. cit.
111 See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia,	Oxford,	Basic	Books,	1974;	M.	N.	Rothbard,	The Ethics 
of..., op. cit.;	H.-H.	Hoppe,	The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. Studies in Political Economy 
and Philosophy,	2nd	Edition,	Auburn,	Alabama,	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2006;	 idem, A Theory 
of Socialism and Capitalism. Economics, Politics and Ethics,	Auburn,	Alabama,	Ludwig	von	Mises	
Institute, 2010.
112 See W. Block, “Libertarian Perspective on Political Economy”, in H. Bouillon (ed.), Libertarians 
and liberalism. Essays in Honour of Gerard Radnitzky,	Avebury,	Aldershot,	 1996,	 p.	 19;	D.	Boaz,	
Libertarianism: A Primer,	New	York,	The	Free	Press,	1998,	p.	15;	Ch.	Kukathas,	“Two	Constructions	
of Libertarianism”, in Libertarian Papers 1, 11, 2009, p. 12.
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Narveson’s approach is different: “My argument, then, does not presuppose the 
libertarian	scheme	of	rights.	Instead	it	argues	for	those	rights,	by	showing	that	the	
scheme	of	rights	can	be	expected	to	work	out	better	for	every	reasonable	person,	if	
applied uniformly to all, than any alternative scheme”. Moreover, as he forcily113 
claims: “Morality in general, and liberty in particular, are to be defended here as 
means, not as ends”.114 A source of ethical obligation in Narveson’s philosophy is 
neither anthropology nor—in a broader sense—ontology, nor epistemology, but only 
a contract. In his opinion, none of the disciplines mentioned above have normative 
or	 magnitudegenic	 implications.	 His	 reflections	 are	 dominated	 by	 meta-ethics115, 
whereas	a	hallmark	of	libertarianism	is	an	anthropological	reflection	preceding	and	
determining	ethical	views;	see	also	Machan’s	critique	above).
Thus, the author of The Libertarian Idea sees	voluntariness	 in	a	different	way	
than libertarians do. Libertarianism does not make the rights of a man to his or her 
body and private property conditional on a voluntary agreement, but it recognizes 
them	as	objective	on	philosophical	(ontological	etc.)	grounds.	If	we	assume	that	a	
particular individual is unusually reluctant to interpersonal relations, so he lives a 
life	without	reaching	any	agreements	with	others,	indeed	without	speaking	to	them,	
that does not indicate he has lost or never had any rights.
As described above, in the approach of Narveson even establishing property 
rights requires a previous “prior agreement” (or “a pre-market bargaining”) in order 
to make reaching a proper social contract possible (of course, not in a concrete act of 
contracting). Hence, “the Libertarian Principle” concerns exclusively those people 
who	accepted	that	agreement.	The	rest	can	be	drowned	in	the	tar-pit—as	Narveson	
claims,	although	he	certainly	wishes	that	all	members	of	the	community	agreed	to	
the	two	voluntary	social	contracts.
But is it still voluntary? What about the disabled, handicapped people, and small 
children	who	cannot	rationally	deliberate	and	who	are	unable	to	ponder	the	politi-
cal	order	or	articulate	their	standpoint?	Furthermore,	following	Narveson’s	line	of	
thought,	one	needs	to	conclude	that	reaching	a	social	contract	with	such	people	is	
often	unprofitable,	since	they	often	are	not	dangerous	in	a	Hobbesian	sense:	“as	to	
strength	of	body,	the	weakest	hath	enough	to	kill	the	strongest”.116 They often cannot 
even	ask	(or	hire)	anybody	to	harm	somebody.	Those,	who	for	some	reason	cannot	
take part in negotiations (even “tacit” ones), are at the mercy of the rest—in the 
brutal	Hobbesian	world	it	is	not	obvious	they	must	survive.	Which	libertarian	would	
agree?	It	is	worth	remembering	the	critique	by	Machan	who	demands	rights	of	every	
113 J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 38.
114 Idem, The Libertarian Idea, op. cit., p. 168.
115	A	wide	approach	to	meta-ethics	as	defined	by	F.	Ricken,	Etyka ogólna,	transl.	P.	Domański,	Kęty,	
Antyk	Marek	Derewiecki,	2001.
116 As quoted in J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 22.
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person	from	a	strict	libertarian	point	of	view—that	individual	rights	are	objectively	
knowable	notwithstanding	the	agreement.	
Thus,	we	 cannot	 stress	 enough	 that,	 in	 opposition	 to	 libertarianism,	Narveson	
regards all ethical issues as conventional, indeed in the most radical sense of a term. 
For a convention does not mean here a culture, a tradition, or an ethos. It is not 
considered	as	 “a	wisdom	of	 ancestors,”	but	 it	 can	be	 created	ad	hoc.	 It	 is	 then	a	
rationalistic conventionalism—a child of the left, and not a child of conservatism 
and traditionalism.117 Moreover, Narveson’s thought is a sort of constructivism, al-
beit	in	a	conventionalist	variant,	where	the	subject	of	a	tacit	political	“construction”	
is demos. It seems that a non-conventional part of his philosophy consists only of 
some	assumptions	of	a	subject	(as,	for	example,	pursuing	one’s	own	interest).	It	is	
worth	mentioning	that	in	the	opinion	of	Justyna	Miklaszewska118 this is natural rights 
libertarianism, and not market contractarianism, that is a sort of constructivism (in 
the Hayekian sense of “false individualism”). Nevertheless, she seems to mean a 
constructivism	conceived	by	a	theoretician’s	blueprint	of	an	ethical	system.	Anyway,	
in strict libertarianism, ethics is derived from an objective philosophical point of 
view119 and not from a close cousin of relativism—a constructivist conventionalism, 
as	in	Narveson’s	views.	Admittedly,	in	a	political	sense,	libertarianism	is	identified	
by its voluntary character, yet there is no doubt that libertarian philosophy recogniz-
es an objective character of the assumptions regarding rights of individuals.
We can say that the idea of voluntariness is distorted in the thought of the Canadi-
an	philosopher.	It	seems	so	because	of	an	idea	of	reciprocity	which	he	proposes	and	
which	is	not	libertarian	in	nature—at	least	not	in	so	extreme	sense.	Narveson	argues	
in	Hobbesian	fashion:	“[Contractarianism]	holds	that	the	principles	of	morals,	what-
ever	they	may	turn	out	to	be,	are	those	we	all	do	have	reason	to	agree	on	provided	all	
others	accept	them	as	well.	(...)	[A]bsent	agreement,	we	revert	to	the	unsatisfactory	
condition	in	which	no	one	can	trust	anyone	else.	Libertarianism	is	a	view	about	the	
substance of that agreement”.120 This quotation makes a point that there cannot be 
a portion of society outside the agreement. We can see merely an all or nothing ap-
proach.	Hence,	we	either	have	morals	and	laissez-faire	politics	or	a	chaotic	state	of	
nature.	However,	this	view	seems	unrepresentative	of	Narveson,	since—as	was	men-
tioned	above—he	considers	a	situation	where	not	everybody	would	like	to	accede	
to	the	social	contract.	We	can	incline	towards	a	hypothesis	that	in	that	case	he	draws	
too much inspiration from Hobbes. Not in a normative, but in a theoretical sense, for 
117 Cf. J. Bartyzel, Śmiertelny bóg Demos,	 Fijorr	 Publishing,	 Warszawa,	 2009,	 Lecture	 III;	 A.	
Chmielewski,	“Filozoficzna	idea	liberalizmu”,	in	J.	Miklaszewska	(ed.)	Liberalizm u schyłku XX wieku, 
Kraków,	Meritum,	1999,	p.	248.
118	J.	Miklaszewska,	Libertariańskie koncepcje wolności i własności,	Kraków,	UJ,	1994,	p.	18.
119 See M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of..., op. cit.;	H.-H.	Hoppe,	The Economics and Ethics..., op. cit.;	
idem, A Theory of Socialism..., op. cit.;	R.	Nozick,	op. cit.
120 J. Narveson, Contracting for Liberty, op. cit., p. 25.
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the	view	of	Hobbes	quoted	above	is	ultimately	inconsistent	with	Narveson’s	own	
view.
He	claims:	“Participants	in	bargaining	games	can	settle	wherever	they	please—so	
says the Lockean Proviso (aka libertarian principle). Once settled, society can insist 
that	they	keep	the	agreement	made,	but	society	simply	has	nothing	to	say	about	how	
they should settle, short of avoiding force and fraud in the negotiation”121 and adds: 
“Non-violence and cooperation are »sine qua nons« of the social game”.122 Sur-
prisingly, these quotations manifest the strictly libertarian character of Narveson’s 
philosophy. Those are the ideas propagated by all representatives of libertarianism. 
However,	when	we	interpret	his	 thought	entirely,	we	should	remember	that	 in	his	
opinion:	“[O]ur	fundamental	conception	must	be	Hobbesian:	we	start	with	no	morals	
at all”.123 Therefore, there is a need of “a prior agreement.” While this “libertarian 
principle” dictates a respect for private property, it is not accepted as absolute and 
objective,	but	it	is	itself	a	subject	of	a	social	contract.	Questions	about	whether	the	
approach of Narveson is indeed libertarian become more and more serious.
It	is	worth	to	ask	why	Narveson	appeals,	albeit	often	only	implicitly,	to	two	social	
contracts. The problem is not completely clear, but one can propose some interpreta-
tion.	For	it	seems	“a	prior	agreement”	serves	to	establish	(social)	morality,	whereas	
the	second	sort	of	a	contract	is	aimed	at	adopting	a	principle	which	regulates	social	
relations, i.e. a political system. So the latter concerns politics. Thus, in this respect 
Narveson is an atypical continuator of Hobbes. For in the philosophy of an English 
thinker, state and society, morals and politics, appear at the same time as a conse-
quence of one social contract. Again, Narveson’s ideas are more similar to Pufendorf 
who	distinguishes	two	social	contacts	and	one	decree	to	thus	justify	an	institution	of	
the state. Thus, social morality and politics are not synonyms in the philosophy of 
Narveson. 
The	question	about	purposefulness	of	the	division	into	two	contracts	maintains	
relevant. It seems the aim is to adopt “the Libertarian Principle” on a moral level 
in order to then legitimize it on the political one—of course this may not occur, but 
Narveson	encourages	people	to	do	it.	Hence,	the	aim	would	be	a	peculiar	legitimiza-
tion of a political institution. The extremely important thing is that, according to the 
Canadian thinker, libertarianism is a system emerging in the second contract.124 It is 
a	proof	that	the	views	of	Narveson	are	not	libertarian,	at	least	as	it	is	characterized	in	
this	chapter.	His	views	can	be	labelled	simply	as	laissez-faire.
Additionally, it can be useful to carry out a thought experiment. Let us ask: could 
Narveson	recognize	a	proposal	of	libertarians	who	are,	according	to	his	terminology,	
121 Idem, Social Contract..., op. cit, p. 229.
122 Ibidem, p. 239.
123 Ibidem, p. 229.
124 See idem, Why Liberty?, op. cit., p. 299.
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intuitionists? Such a question seems to be rather trivial, but in fact is interesting and 
enables a deeper argument as regards the relation of Narveson’s thought and liber-
tarianism.	To	answer	the	above	question	we	need	to	consider	his	seemingly	obvious	
standpoint	on	views	of	typical	libertarians.	Let	us	consider	the	views	of	Rothbard125 
and	Hans-Hermann	Hoppe;126 both of them claim that they propose philosophical 
foundations	of	libertarian	ethics	which	meet	the	condition	of	rationalist	philosophiz-
ing, that is, they are intersubjectively communicative. Both claim that a tool of their 
work	is	reason.	Not	just	reason,	but	human	reason,	which	man	as	a	species	possesses.	
Thus	they	claim	that	the	views	they	advocate	are	not	just	their	views,	but	the	neces-
sary	judgements,	that	cannot	be	rationally	rejected.	Of	course,	we	should	notice	that	
this description applies to Hoppe to a much greater extent. Narveson rejects such 
approaches	to	moral	philosophy	and	defines	them	as	theories	based	on	intuition.	He	
rejects them, because he is much more liberal than Rothbard or Hoppe. Liberal in a 
philosophical	sense	of	the	term,	we	should	add,	but	of	course	it	has	also	consequenc-
es	for	his	political	views.	We	can	suppose	that	the	theories	of	Rothbard	and	Hoppe	
would	be	characterized	by	him	as	(too)	 transcendent	or	metaphysical,	whereas	he	
seems to prefer a liberal prescinding from metaphysics.
Since	people	can	have	different	views	of	human	nature,	evidenced	by	the	exist-
ence of people adhering to different ethical systems, there is no universal natural 
rights or intuitionist means for justifying a political system. Such beliefs induce him 
to	recognize	the	social	contract	theory	as	justified.127
After	these	considerations	have	been	presented,	we	can	finally	answer	the	above-
mentioned	question:	could	Narveson	recognize	a	proposal	of	libertarians	who	are,	
according	 to	 his	 terminology,	 intuitionists?	The	 answer	 is:	 “yes”	 and	 “we	do	not	
know”,	and	the	choice	depends	on	who	we	ask—Narveson-political-philosopher	or	
Narveson-moral-subject.
Of course, as a political philosopher he explicitly rejects proposals of theorists 
whom	he	regards	as	intuitionists.	But	it	is	difficult	to	know	what	is	his	personal	“in-
tuition”	(and	whether	he	has	one)—what	is	an	opinion	of	his	as the moral subject. It 
is	clear	that	he	must	believe	that	his	own	intuition	is	as	subjective	as	the	intuitions	
of	others.	That	is	why	he	would	not	mention	in	his	philosophical	writing	on	morality	
and politics his individual, subjective or intuitive opinion on human nature (if he had 
one), since he considers it as invalid in those branches of philosophy. For he regards 
it	as	a	subject	of	a	metaphysical	speculation	which	everybody	is	allowed	to	under-
take,	but	which	is	unknowable	within	rational	cognition	of	normative	principles	of	
ethics and politics. Thus, according to him, it is an approach that does not meet the 
criteria	of	intersubjective	verification.	Nevertheless	one	cannot	rule	out	that	Narve-
125 See M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of..., op. cit.;	idem, For a New Liberty, op. cit.
126 See H.-H. Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics..., op. cit.;	idem, A Theory of Socialism..., op. cit.
127 J. Narveson, Why Liberty?, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
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son-moral	subject	accepts	the	approach	of	Rothbard	or	Hoppe,	but	it	would	be—let	
us repeat—irrelevant for him as the political philosopher.	Anyway,	the	crucial	thing	
is that Narveson does not mention that natural rights do not exist. He merely points 
out that people can have different opinions on that matter, so appealing to the idea 
of	natural	rights	is	not	functional.	However,	if	he	had	such	an	opinion	as	the	moral	
subject,	he	would	be	in	a	closer	position	to	libertarians	from	whom	he	would	then	
differ epistemologically and ontologically.
But	how	can	one	know	that	if	Narveson,	as	the	moral	subject,	adopts	some	nat-
ural	 rights	 theory,	 it	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 libertarian	 standpoint?	One	 can	 know	
because	his	contractarianism	is	market	contractarianism	beginning	with	bargaining	
individuals	aware	of	their	self-interests	capable	of	reaching	a	social	contract	with	an	
imperative	of	obeying	it.	Finally,	one	can	know,	since	the	political	system	he	pro-
poses to establish by a contractarian method—designed as a compromise—could not 
contradict	his	own	idea	of	natural	rights	(assuming	he	has	one).	For	this	method	is	
meant	to	attract	everyone—even	those	with	ethical	intuitions.	On	this	basis	one	can	
know	that	respective	and	diverse	ethical	intuitions	must	square	with	the	contractar-
ian “Liberty Principle” postulated by Narveson. Thus, the requirement must apply 
also	to	his	own	intuitions.
So	it	is	possible	that	personally	the	philosopher	is	inclined	towards	a	libertarian	
“intuitionism”,128	but	uses	contractarianism	as	an	instrument	which	meets	his	philo-
sophical	criteria.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	would	be	nothing	new.	For	it	would	be	a	similar	
strategy	to	that	which	is	used	by	Christian	authors	who	try	to	prove	religious	truths	
by	appealing	to	rationalist	doctrine	of	natural	law	(but	which,	one	should	admit,	is	
consistent	with	Christianity	on	a	basis	that	there	is	natural	moral	law	written	into	a	
conscience of human beings).
However,	in	the	light	of	the	foundations	of	libertarianism,	as	they	are	presented	
in this chapter, even such assumption could not make the contractarian proposal of 
Narveson libertarianism sensu stricto. Although he is a careful commentator of liber-
tarian	political	philosophy,	there	are	too	many	differences	between	his	philosophical	
approach	and	the	tradition	of	thinking	which	is	represented	by	libertarians.	Hence,	
his	philosophical	assumptions	and	their	practical	implications	are	inconsistent	with	
libertarianism.
128 It should be noted that it is not an interpretation of the philosophy of Narveson, but an assumption 
for the sake of recognizing a thesis.
